Navigating public charitable trust litigation often raises complex procedural hurdles regarding when courts can intervene. In a recent judgment addressing whether civil courts possess the authority to issue protective interim orders before granting leave to institute a suit, the Supreme Court of India delivered a comprehensive ruling clarifying the statutory boundaries of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The case arose from Civil Appeal Nos. of 2026 arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 25577-25579 of 2025, with the judgment pronounced on September 18, 2026. The central legal issue evaluated by the Court was whether a civil court seized of a plaint under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, alongside a leave application, can pass preservatory interim orders during the pendency of that leave application.
Background and Legal Proceedings
The dispute originated from the High Court of Karnataka, which had set aside a trial court order appointing an ad hoc committee to manage the day-to-day affairs of a public trust pending further directions. The High Court maintained its prior stance that a suit filed under Section 92 remains stillborn without prior leave, leaving the judiciary denuded of jurisdiction to grant interlocutory remedies beforehand.
Appellants argued that courts should not be rendered helpless spectators while leave applications remain pending. They contended that provisions relating to supplemental proceedings and inherent powers allow courts to appoint receivers to safeguard trust properties. Conversely, respondents maintained that obtaining leave acts as a strict threshold condition and mandatory pre-requisite before any substantive or interlocutory proceedings can materialize.
The Supreme Court Ruling
The Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed that a civil court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders like appointing a receiver before officially granting leave under Section 92. The bench underscored that Section 92 serves as a deliberate legislative balancing act functioning both as a protective shield for trusts against vexatious litigation and as a remedial sword. Because a suit against public charities is instituted only upon the successful grant of leave, any interim measures attempted prior to that threshold lack proper legal foundation.
However, recognizing that genuine emergencies can arise requiring immediate judicial intervention to protect public trust assets, the Court introduced a pragmatic remedy. The order established that where compelling facts demand urgent relief, the court may dispense with the requirement of issuing prior notice to defendants before granting leave. This mechanism ensures that institutions remain protected against immediate harm while preserving the defendant’s right to subsequently seek the revocation of leave on merits.
Read the Judgment here.